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Why Does Bitcoin Have Value?

Think of a world without essential third parties, including the most dangerous third party ever conceived of by man: the state and the central bank.

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Image Credit: Tim Reckmann/Flickr

Penned by Jeffery A. Tucker at American Institute for Economic Research

Even after eleven years experience, and a per Bitcoin price of nearly $20,000, the incredulous are still with us. I understand why. Bitcoin is not like other traditional financial assets. Even describing it as an asset is misleading. It is not the same as a stock, as a payment system, or a money. It has features of all these but it is not identical to them. What Bitcoin is depends on its use as a means of storing and porting value, which in turn rests of secure titles to ownership of a scarce good. Those without experience in the sector look at all of this and get frustrated that understanding why it is valuable is not so easy to grasp. 

In this article, I’m updating an analysis I wrote six years ago. It still holds up. For those who don’t want to slog through the entire article, my thesis is that Bitcoin’s value obtains from its underlying technology, which is an open-source ledger that keeps track of ownership rights and permits the transfer of these rights. Bitcoin managed to bundle its unit of account with a payment system that lives on the ledger. That’s its innovation and why it obtained a value and that value continues to rise. 

Consider the criticism offered by traditional gold advocates, who have, for decades, pushed the idea that sound money must be backed by something real, hard, and independently valuable. Bitcoin doesn’t qualify, right? Maybe it does. 

Bitcoin first emerged as a possible competitor to national, government-managed money in 2009. Satoshi Nakamoto’s white paper was released October 31, 2008. The structure and language of this paper sent the message: This currency is for computer technicians, not economists nor political pundits. The paper’s circulation was limited; novices who read it were mystified. 

But the lack of interest didn’t stop history from moving forward. Two months later, those who were paying attention saw the emergence of the “Genesis Block,” the first group of bitcoins generated through Nakamoto’s concept of a distributed ledger that lived on any computer node in the world that wanted to host it.

Here we are all these years later and a single bitcoin trades at $18,500. The currency is held and accepted by many thousands of institutions, both online and offline. Its payment system is very popular in poor countries without vast banking infrastructures but also in developed countries. And major institutions—including the Federal Reserve, the OECD, the World Bank, and major investment houses—are paying respectful attention and weaving blockchain technology into their operations.. 

Enthusiasts, who are found in every country, say that its exchange value will soar even more in the future because its supply is strictly limited and it provides a system vastly superior to government money. Bitcoin is transferred between individuals without a third party. It is relatively low-cost to exchange. It has a predictable supply. It is durable, fungible, and divisible: all crucial features of money. It creates a monetary system that doesn’t depend on trust and identity, much less on central banks and government. It is a new system for the digital age.

Hard lessons for hard money

To those educated in the “hard money” tradition, the whole idea has been a serious challenge. Speaking for myself, I had been reading about bitcoin for two years before I came anywhere close to understanding it. There was just something about the whole idea that bugged me. You can’t make money out of nothing, much less out of computer code. Why does it have value then? There must be something amiss. This is not how we expected money to be reformed.

There’s the problem: our expectations. We should have been paying closer attention to Ludwig von Mises’ theory of money’s origins—not to what we think he wrote, but to what he actually did write. 

In 1912, Mises released The Theory of Money and Credit. It was a huge hit in Europe when it came out in German, and it was translated into English. While covering every aspect of money, his core contribution was in tracing the value and price of money—and not just money itself—to its origins. That is, he explained how money gets its price in terms of the goods and services it obtains. He later called this process the “regression theorem,” and as it turns out, bitcoin satisfies the conditions of the theorem.

Mises’ teacher, Carl Menger, demonstrated that money itself originates from the market—not from the State and not from social contract. It emerges gradually as monetary entrepreneurs seek out an ideal form of commodity for indirect exchange. Instead of merely bartering with each other, people acquire a good not to consume, but to trade. That good becomes money, the most marketable commodity.

But Mises added that the value of money traces backward in time to its value as a bartered commodity. Mises said that this is the only way money can have value.

The theory of the value of money as such can trace back the objective exchange value of money only to that point where it ceases to be the value of money and becomes merely the value of a commodity…. If in this way we continually go farther and farther back we must eventually arrive at a point where we no longer find any component in the objective exchange value of money that arises from valuations based on the function of money as a common medium of exchange; where the value of money is nothing other than the value of an object that is useful in some other way than as money…. Before it was usual to acquire goods in the market, not for personal consumption, but simply in order to exchange them again for the goods that were really wanted, each individual commodity was only accredited with that value given by the subjective valuations based on its direct utility.

Mises’ explanation solved a major problem that had long mystified economists. It is a narrative of conjectural history, and yet it makes perfect sense. Would salt have become money had it otherwise been completely useless? Would beaver pelts have obtained monetary value had they not been useful for clothing? Would silver or gold have had money value if they had no value as commodities first? The answer in all cases of monetary history is clearly no. The initial value of money, before it becomes widely traded as money, originates in its direct utility. It’s an explanation that is demonstrated through historical reconstruction. That’s Mises’ regression theorem.

Bitcoin’s use value

At first glance, bitcoin would seem to be an exception. You can’t use a bitcoin for anything other than money. It can’t be worn as jewelry. You can’t make a machine out of it. You can’t eat it or even decorate with it. Its value is only realized as a unit that facilitates indirect exchange. And yet, bitcoin already is money. It’s used every day. You can see the exchanges in real time. It’s not a myth. It’s the real deal.

It might seem like we have to choose. Is Mises wrong? Maybe we have to toss out his whole theory. Or maybe his point was purely historical and doesn’t apply in the future of a digital age. Or maybe his regression theorem is proof that bitcoin is just an empty mania with no staying power, because it can’t be reduced to its value as a useful commodity.

And yet, you don’t have to resort to complicated monetary theory in order to understand the sense of alarm surrounding bitcoin. Many people, as I did, just have a feeling of uneasiness about a money that has no basis in anything physical. Sure, you can print out a bitcoin on a piece of paper, but having a paper with a QR code or a public key is not enough to relieve that sense of unease.

How can we resolve this problem? In my own mind, I toyed with the issue for more than a year. It puzzled me. I wondered if Mises’ insight applied only in a pre-digital age. I followed the speculations online that the value of bitcoin would be zero but for the national currencies into which it is converted. Perhaps the demand for bitcoin overcame the demands of Mises’ scenario because of a desperate need for something other than the dollar.

As time passed—and I read the work of Konrad Graf, Peter Surda, and Daniel Krawisz—finally the resolution came. Bitcoin is both a payment system and a money. The payment system is the source of value, while the accounting unit merely expresses that value in terms of price. The unity of money and payment is its most unusual feature, and the one that most commentators have had trouble wrapping their heads around.

We are all used to thinking of currency as separate from payment systems. This thinking is a reflection of the technological limitations of history. There is the dollar and there are credit cards. There is the euro and there is PayPal. There is the yen and there are wire services. In each case, money transfer relies on third-party service providers. In order to use them, you need to establish what is called a “trust relationship” with them, which is to say that the institution arranging the deal has to believe that you are going to pay.

This wedge between money and payment has always been with us, except for the case of physical proximity.

If I give you a dollar for your pizza slice, there is no third party. But payment systems, third parties, and trust relationships become necessary once you leave geographic proximity. That’s when companies like Visa and institutions like banks become indispensable. They are the application that makes the monetary software do what you want it to do.

The hitch is that the payment systems we have today are not available to just anyone. In fact, a vast majority of humanity does not have access to such tools, which is a major reason for poverty in the world. The financially disenfranchised are confined to only local trade and cannot extend their trading relationships with the world.

A major, if not a primary, purpose of developing Bitcoin was to solve this problem. The protocol set out to weave together the currency feature with a payment system. The two are interlinked in the structure of the code itself. This connection is what makes bitcoin different from any existing national currency, and, really, any currency in history.

Let Nakamoto speak from the introductory abstract to his white paper. Observe how central the payment system is to the monetary system he created:

A purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow online payments to be sent directly from one party to another without going through a financial institution. Digital signatures provide part of the solution, but the main benefits are lost if a trusted third party is still required to prevent double-spending. We propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer network. The network timestamps transactions by hashing them into an ongoing chain of hash-based proof-of-work, forming a record that cannot be changed without redoing the proof-of-work. The longest chain not only serves as proof of the sequence of events witnessed, but proof that it came from the largest pool of CPU power. As long as a majority of CPU power is controlled by nodes that are not cooperating to attack the network, they’ll generate the longest chain and outpace attackers. The network itself requires minimal structure. Messages are broadcast on a best effort basis, and nodes can leave and rejoin the network at will, accepting the longest proof-of-work chain as proof of what happened while they were gone.

What’s very striking about this paragraph is that there is not even one mention of the currency unit itself. There is only the mention of the problem of double-spending (which is to say, the problem of inflationary money creation beyond which the protocol would otherwise permit). The innovation here, even according to the words of its inventor, is the payment network, not the coin. The coin or digital unit only expresses the value of the network. It is an accounting tool that absorbs and carries the value of the network through time and space.

This network is the blockchain. It’s a ledger that lives in the digital cloud, a distributed network, and it can be observed in operation by anyone at any time. It is carefully monitored by all users. It allows the transference of secure and non-repeatable bits of information from one person to any other person anywhere in the world, and these information bits are secured by a digital form of property title. This is what Nakamoto called “digital signatures.” His invention of the cloud-based ledger allows property rights to be verified without having to depend on some third-party trust agency.

The blockchain solved what has come to be known as the Byzantine generals’ problem. This is the problem of coordinating action over a large geographic range in the presence of potentially malicious actors. Because generals separated by space have to rely on messengers and this reliance takes time and trust, no general can be absolutely sure that the other general has received and confirmed the message, much less its accuracy.

Putting a ledger, to which everyone has access, on the Internet overcomes this problem. The ledger records the amounts, the times, and the public addresses of every transaction. The information is shared across the globe and always gets updated. The ledger guarantees the integrity of the system and allows the currency unit to become a digital form of property with a title.

Once you understand this, you can see that the value proposition of bitcoin is bound up with its attached payment network. Here is where you find the use value to which Mises refers. It is not embedded in the currency unit but rather in the brilliant and innovative payment system on which bitcoin lives. If it were possible for the blockchain to be somehow separated from bitcoin (and, really, this is not possible), the value of the currency would instantly fall to zero.

Proof of concept

Now, to further understand how Mises’ theory fits with bitcoin, you have to understand one other point concerning the history of the cryptocurrency. On the day of its release (January 9, 2009), the value of bitcoin was exactly zero. And so it remained for 10 months after its release. All the while, transactions were taking place, but it had no posted value above zero for this entire time.

The first posted price of bitcoin appeared on October 5, 2009. On this exchange, $1 equaled 1,309.03 Bitcoin (which many considered overpriced at the time). In other words, the first valuation of bitcoin was little more than one-tenth of a penny. Yes, if you had bought $100 worth of bitcoin in those days, and not sold them in some panic, you would be a half-billionaire today.

So here is the question: What happened between January 9 and October 5, 2009, to cause bitcoin to obtain a market value? The answer is that traders, enthusiasts, entrepreneurs, and others were trying out the blockchain. They wanted to know if it worked. Did it transfer the units without double-spending? Did a system that depended on voluntary CPU power actually suffice to verify and confirm transactions? Do the rewarded bitcoins land in the right spot as payment for verification services? Most of all, did this new system actually work to do the seemingly impossible—that is, to move secure bits of title-based information through geographic space, not by using some third party but rather peer-to-peer?

It took 10 months to build confidence. It took another 18 months before bitcoin reached parity with the U.S. dollar. This history is essential to understand, especially if you are relying on a theory of money’s origins that speculates about the pre-history of money, as Mises’ regression theorem does. Bitcoin was not always a money with value. It was once a pure accounting unit attached to a ledger. This ledger obtained what Mises called “use value.” All conditions of the theorem are thereby satisfied.

Final accounting

To review, if anyone says that bitcoin is based on nothing but thin air, that it cannot be a money because it has no real history as a genuine commodity, and whether the person saying this is a novice or a highly trained economist, you need to bring up two central points. One, bitcoin is not a stand-alone currency but a unit of accounting attached to an innovative payment network. Two, this network and therefore bitcoin only obtained its market value through real-time testing in a market environment.

In other words, once you account for the razzle-dazzle technical features, bitcoin emerged exactly like every other currency, from salt to gold, did. People found the payment system useful, and the attached accounting was portable, divisible, fungible, durable, and scarce.

A new form of money was born. This money has all the best features of money from history but adds a weightless and spaceless payment network, one that is reliable and verified in real time, that enables the entire world to trade without having to rely on third parties. 

But notice something extremely important here. The blockchain is not only about money. It is about any information transfers that require security, confirmations, and total assurance of authenticity. This pertains to contracts and transactions of all sorts, all performed peer-to-peer. 

To be sure, the sector has come to be dominated by third parties that operate mainly as custodians. The crucial point is that this is a market development driven by consumer desire but it is not necessary for the functioning of the system. In addition, thousands of additional tokens have appeared that operate and compete in the crypto sector which is now worth, at the time of this writing, $560 billion in market capitalization. 

Think of a world without essential third parties, including the most dangerous third party ever conceived of by man: the state and the central bank. Imagine that future and you begin to grasp the fullness of the implications of our future.

Ludwig von Mises would be amazed and surprised at bitcoin. But he might also feel a sense of pride that his monetary theory of more than a century ago has been confirmed and given new life in the 21st century.

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Economy

McMaken: The Fed’s Inflation Is Behind the Supply-Chain Mess

… the idea that supply chain problems are “driving inflation” gets the causation backward.

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It seems supporters of the Biden Administration finally settled on a narrative they like for explaining away supply chain shortages.

Here’s the administration’s talking point: the US economy is rolling along so well that Americans are demanding huge amounts of goods. That’s overwhelming the supply chain and causing the back-ups roiling America’s ports and logistic infrastructure.

For example, Transportation Secretary Buttigieg this month declared “Demand is up … because income is up, because the president has successfully guided this economy out of the teeth of a terrifying recession.”

Similarly, White House spokeswoman Jen Psaki told reporters supply chain problems are occurring because “people have more money … their wages are up…“we’ve seen an economic recovery that is underway…”

This position has been mocked by a number of conservative politicians—including Senator Ted Cruz—and commentators who find this to be an absurd assumption.

Yet, the administrator’s defenders aren’t totally wrong. As Mihai Macovei showed earlier this month, the global volume of trade  and shipping volume in 2021 have actually exceeded pre-pandemic numbers. For example, in the port of Los Angeles, “loaded imports” and “total imports” for the 2020-2021 fiscal year (ending June 30, 2021) were both up when compared to the same period of the 2018-2019 fiscal year.

In other words, it’s not as if nothing’s moving through these ports. In fact, more is moving through them than ever before. That suggests demand is indeed higher.

But why is it higher? It some ways, it’s true that, as Psaki says, people have more money. 

But that’s where the veracity and usefulness of Biden’s defenders end in explaining the problem. 

Much of the answer can be found in monetary inflation. Obviously, Joe Biden hasn’t “successfully guided the economy” through anything, but it is accurate to say that people have more money in a nominal sense. Wages are up nominally. After all, if we look at the immense amount of new money created over the past 18 months, we should absolutely expect people to have more money sloshing around. But this also means a lot more pressure on the logistical infrastructure as people buy up more consumer goods.

In other words, the idea that supply chain problems are “driving inflation” gets the causation backward. It’s money-supply inflation that’s causing much of the supply chain’s problems.  Not the other way around. 

After all, since February 2020, M2 has increased from $15.2 trillion to $20.9 trillion in September 2021. That’s an increase of 35 percent. Yes, some of that has been kept within the banking system through the Fed’s payment of interest on reserves, but a lot of it clearly has entered the “real economy” through stimulus payments, unemployment insurance, and federal deficit spending in general.

Originally, the public was saving a lot of that stimulus and bailout money, with the personal savings rate hitting historic highs of over 25 percent. But this past summer the savings rate collapsed again, and as of September is back under eight percent. The public is now flooding the economy with its former savings.

The American appetite for spending on consumer goods hasn’t gone away. Yet, there are many reasons to suspect this spending spree is unsupported by actual economic activity, and in a phenomenon of monetary inflation.

For example, today’s tsunami of spending raises questions when we consider there are still about five million fewer people working in the American economy than was the case in early 2020. That means fewer people being paid wages. Without monetary inflation, an economy with millions of fewer workers suggests there should be less spending.

Additionally, spending increases when the public suspects that inflation is going to increase. That is, if there is perception the value of money will decline, the demand for money will decline also. As Ludwig von Mises noted: “once public opinion is convinced … the prices of all commodities and services will not cease to rise, everybody becomes eager to buy as much as possible and to restrict his cash holding to a minimum size.”

That means more spending. This phenomenon is already clear in home prices and grocery prices. The public may suspect rising prices are here to stay. Meanwhile, the Consumer Price Index—a very limited measure of goods-price inflation—is nonetheless near a 35-year high.  That means now’s a good time to spend.

With 2020’s panic-induced saving subsiding, people are now wondering if their savings produce any returns. But ordinary savers are surely now remembering that the interest returns from savings right now are next to nothing. Thanks to the central bank’s ultra-low interest rate policy, we live in a  yield-starved world. That’s OK for hedge funders who can participate in carry trades and other high-yield forms of investment. But for regular people they’re stuck with interest rates that don’t keep up with price inflation. So it makes more sense to spend dollars rather than save them. 

So, Biden’s people are correct in a certain sense that people have “more money” and that “demand is up.” With federal spending hitting historic highs—and half of it is deficit spending that’s being monetized—we should expect people to have “more money.” This is just what we would expect in an inflationary environment. We should expect demand for everything (but money) to be up. 

The question, however, is how much of this windfall will continue in real, inflation-adjusted terms. It’s too early to tell, although we can also see that inflation-adjusted median earnings collapsed 6.3 percent, year over year, during the second quarter of 2021. We can see that real GDP growth has dramatically slowed.

But at least as far as the third quarter is concerned, it’s fairly clear the US was—and likely still is—in the midst of an inflationary boom. But how long will it last?

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Economy

There Are Still Over 14 Million Americans On Some Form Of Government Dole

… we remind readers of the gaping chasm between those still claiming some form of pandemic-related unemployment benefit and the record number of job openings in America currently…

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Initial jobless claims hovered at post-COVID-lockdown lows but were disappointing at 373k – well above the 200k-ish norms of pre-COVID

Source: Bloomberg

Notably, California and Virginia ‘estimated’ their jobless claims last week and Pennsylvania continues to swing wildly from week to week…

But, while the picture is improving overall, we should still remember that there are over 14 million Americans still on some of government dole…

Source: Bloomberg

We do note that 460k Americans dropped off the pandemic emergency aid rolls…

Finally, we remind readers of the gaping chasm between those still claiming some form of pandemic-related unemployment benefit and the record number of job openings in America currently…

Source: Bloomberg

Tick-tock on those benefits.

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Economy

The Fed in a Box Part 2: They Cannot End Quantitative Easing

If inflation doesn’t slow in the coming months, the Fed may be forced to step in.

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Kurtis Garbutt/Flickr
  1. If the Fed tapers QE, it may reveal waning appetite for long-term treasuries
  2. The Treasury may have used its cash balance reserve to anchor inflation expectations
  3. If inflation persists, the Fed may have to increase rather than decrease QE

Note: By definition, inflation is an expansion of the money supply. In this article, inflation will be used interchangeably with rising prices (usually as a result of money supply expansion)

Introduction

When the economy was shut down in March 2020, the government responded with massive fiscal and monetary support. The fiscal stimulus totaled $4T+ in relief packages. All of this spending was paid for with debt issued by the Treasury. The Treasury mostly issued short-term debt. With rates being held at zero by the Fed, and strong demand for short-term debt, it made sense to quickly raise cash using Treasury Bills as interest-free loans.

The Fed monetary policy was two fold, slash short-term rates to zero and inject $1.5 trillion into the long-term debt treasury market. The effect was to bring down interest rates across the entire yield curve. After the initial debt binge, QE went on auto-pilot, with the central bank buying about $80B a month in long-term debt (plus another $40B in Mortgage debt). Over the last year, the Treasury has continued to issue long-term debt, averaging more than the $80B the Fed has been buying. This has caused long-term rates to rise.

All of this fiscal and monetary stimulus is not without cost. Historically this type of activity almost always leads to higher inflation. The Fed may have recently indicated it wants higher inflation, but this is not true. This stance simply provides cover for them to not act in the face of rising prices. To actually fight inflation, the Fed would have to increase short-term rates above the rate of inflation. Part 1 of this series went into detail about how US short-term debt has doubled from $2.5T to $4.5T. This makes even small changes in short-term rates an immediate risk to the federal government, not to mention the much higher rates needed in a true inflation fight.

In theory, the Fed could leave short-term rates at 0% while ending QE and even shrinking its balance sheet. This would push long-term rates up to combat inflation. In the short/medium term the Treasury can mathematically handle higher long-term rates because it takes time for the higher rates to work their way through long-term debt. See the chart below that shows how the last tightening cycle worked its way through the average interest rate across debt instrument. Specifically, look at Notes compared to Bills. The average weighted interest rate on Bills moved very quickly where the rate on Notes barely had time to increase before rates dropped again.

Source – Treasurydirect.gov

Although the Treasury could handle rising long-term rates (even if the economy and mortgage market cannot), the Fed has another problem. Rising long-term rates send an important message: rising inflation expectations. While inflation is first and foremost a result of monetary policy, higher inflation expectations quickly exacerbate the problem. This is why the Fed has been messaging they are OK with higher inflation and also why they have been pounding the table that inflation is transitory. They need to keep inflation expectations low! If inflation expectations were to rise, especially at this critical juncture, it would be game over for the Fed, as they would have to raise short-term rates (devastating the Treasury and economy) in order to save the dollar and squash inflation.

With the economy opening up in March of this year, things were getting very precarious as inflation was rapidly rising along with surging long-term rates. Remember that rising long-term rates indicate rising inflation expectations. This could cause transitory inflation to be much less transitory.

In summer 2020, the Treasury issued enough debt to build up a significant cash reserve. In response to rising long-term rates in Q1 2021, it appears the Treasury strategically used its cash reserves to slow down the issuance of long-term debt. With total short-term debt outstanding already so high, the cash balance gave the Treasury ammunition to decrease debt issuance just as a $1.9T stimulus bill was passed and inflation was set to explode higher. This would have been perfect timing to support the Feds narrative that inflation is transitory to keep expectations from snowballing out of control.

If inflation doesn’t slow in the coming months, the Fed may be forced to step in. With the Treasury poised to issue more debt, it can no longer rely on its one-time use of excess cash reserves. This will put more pressure on the Fed to clamp down long-term rates by increasing rather than decreasing QE. Yes, the Fed may decide to print more money (leading to higher prices) to fight rising inflation expectations (higher long-term interest rates).

Understanding recent fiscal and monetary maneuvers

Last year, when the pandemic hit, the US Government started spending trillions of dollars. Massive spending plans were approved in the name of stimulus and COVID relief. Because the government does not have much money on hand, and taxes cannot quickly be raised, the Treasury issued trillions in debt. The markets can easily absorb short-term US Treasury Bills, so when the Fed abruptly cut rates to 0%, the Treasury responded by issuing short-term debt to the tune of $2.4T from March to June 2020. See figure 1 below.

Source – Treasurydirect.gov

In tandem, the Fed bought up trillions of dollars in US Debt, but the Fed was buying on the long end of the curve while the Treasury was issuing debt on the short end. This caused long-term rates to collapse. The Fed purchased enough long-term debt to absorb more than a year’s worth of long-term debt issuance. The chart below shows how the month over month and cumulative change in the Feds balance sheet compared to the Treasury Debt Issuance of long-term notes and bonds.

Source – Treasurydirect.gov

This action by the Fed had a massive impact on long-term rates. The chart below shows the difference between the two bars above, specifically the difference in Fed Buying and Treasury issuance of long-term debt for each individual month since Jan 2020. These values are not cumulative. The right Y-Axis shows the month-end interest rate of the 10-year bond. Looking at this chart shows something extremely clear: When the Fed buying exceeds debt issuance, rates are flat or falling; however when long-term debt issuance surpasses the Fed’s buying, rates rise.

Source – Treasurydirect.gov

The impact of the Fed can first be seen as interest rates fell from 1.5% to .6% during the initial buying spree. After the initial burst, the Fed put QE on auto-pilot, buying “only” $80B a month in long-term Treasuries. However, because the Treasury was issuing more than $80B a month as depicted by the positive bars starting in June 2020, interest rates started rising.

This trend started to accelerate in November of 2020, as long-term debt issuance was outpacing Fed Buying by around $200B. Things really started to escalate in the first quarter of 2021 as Treasury Debt issuance surpassed Fed buying by $286B in March right as interest rates were crossing above 1.7%.

Then, suddenly, long-term debt issuance started falling in April and was almost even with Fed buying in May. This consequently led to a fall in long-term rates, which are now hovering back around 1.5%. How did this happen just as Biden was pushing through a $1.9 stimulus package? Unlike 2020, when short-term debt issuance was used to plug the gap, Figure 1 above shows that short-term debt issuance was actually turning negative (blue bars).

What gives?

One look at the Treasury Cash Balance sheet in the chart below tells almost the entire story. This was first highlighted by a SchiffGold article published June 16. The chart below shows a massive surge in cash reserves by the treasury last year. Since March of this year, the cash balance has plummeted by over $1T.

Source – Treasurydirect.gov

Inflation Expectations

Why such a massive and sudden drawdown in the cash balance? In truth, there could be lots of reasons, but it does seem extremely sudden. One would think the Treasury, led by Yellen, would be very deliberate and thoughtful about how to use up $1T+ in dry powder. For the past 3 months, the Fed has been shouting from the rooftops that inflation is transitory. At the June FOMC press conference, Powell stood up and explained how long-term inflation expectations remain well-anchored. A proxy for inflation expectations is long-term interest rates.

Had interest rates continued to rise similar to the recent trajectory (climbing from .8% in Nov to 1.7% in March), this would have been a difficult narrative to push. The Fed needs inflation expectations to remain in check or else inflation will be anything but transitory. Thus, the perfect time for the Treasury to pause issuance of long-term debt would be April-June 2021 just as the economy is re-opening and the Fed is forecasting inflation to be at its worst before coming back down.

While this is speculation, it would be a very strategic move from both Powell and Yellen. Regardless of the intention though, the problem is that the Treasury has now spent its large cash balance. It could return to the short-term debt market, but the outstanding balance is still sitting above $4T (see part 1). It needs to be converting that short-term debt to long-term debt while long-term interest rates are still low and the Fed is still buying. But the Fed is simply not buying enough at $80B to convert all that debt!

If inflation persists beyond a few months, then interest rates are going to rise in a hurry as the market demands higher rates. Adding fuel to the fire will be the Treasury debt issuance overwhelming the $80B Fed buying as it did from November to March.

Then what?

Who is absorbing the long-term debt to keep interest rates from returning to the upward trajectory from Aug 2020 – Mar 2021?

International creditors have had little appetite for US Debt lately. The chart below shows the total outstanding debt held by foreign governments. In the past 15 months, while the Treasury has issued over $4T in new debt, the net amount bought by foreign governments is close to zero.

Source – https://ticdata.treasury.gov/Publish/mfh.txt

To zoom into the exact amount of change since the massive debt issuance, see the chart below. In total, foreign creditors have absorbed $120 billion of $6T+ or less than 2% of total issuance!

Source – https://ticdata.treasury.gov/Publish/mfh.txt

How are rates going to stay low if the Fed keeps the treasury buying cap at $80B? The Treasury will have to issue more than $80B in long-term debt to continue funding all the massive spending. If inflation expectations stay low, maybe the market will have enough firepower to ingest some of the new debt, but not all of it. With the Fed planning to begin tapering at the end of the year, someone will need to fill the $80 billion void. This does not even take into account the possibility of shrinking the Fed balance sheet, which should be considered impossible at this point.

The chart of the international holders above brings to mind the image of the Wiley Coyote running off a cliff. With 10-year interest rates hovering near 1.5%, one could argue there is strong demand for long-term Treasury debt. Unfortunately, foreign creditors have turned off their debt purchases. It took decades for them to accumulate ~$7T in Treasury debt. The Fed alone has accumulated more than half that (~$4.5T) over the last decade. The Fed is making the market seem strong, but as shown above, there might be nothing but air if they were to exit the market. With a thumb on the scale, no one is getting an accurate reading of true demand for US long-term debt.

Source – Warner Brothers

What about short-term debt markets?

As highlighted several times, the demand for short-term debt seems to remain very strong. This makes sense as T-Bills mature in less than a year, so these investments are perceived as nearly risk-free. In fact, it could be argued that the recent Treasury Bill issuance hiatus (Figure 1 – blue bars turning negative) could be causing stress in the Reverse Repo market. The chart below shows the current Reverse Repo market. Based on past quarter-end data, it’s very possible that Reverse Repos could exceed $1.5T by this coming Wednesday, June 30, before coming back down.

Source – https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RRPONTSYD

Many articles have been written to explain this phenomenon, without providing exact clarity on what’s actually going on. The current understanding seems to be that the banks are awash with cash – so much cash, they are hitting the limits in terms of how much cash they can hold on balance overnight. This is cash that should be invested on behalf of money market funds. But with so much cash in the system, if it were to all be invested in short-term debt instruments, it could drive rates negative. To avoid negative rates, the Fed is lending banks assets on its balance sheet overnight in exchange for cash. It is critical to avoid negative rates to insure money market funds never experience a loss and result in breaking the buck.

Maybe this is a leap too far, but it seems another solution to the Fed reverse repurchase activity could be for the Treasury to issue more short-term debt. So, why has the Treasury been drawing down its cash balance and letting short-term debt mature when there seems to be strong demand in the market? The Treasury must recognize the risk of having too much debt in short-term instruments and is trying to lengthen the duration of its debt outstanding. Unfortunately, this abundance of cash in the repo market is in search of low-risk short-term debt so will not provide demand for long-term debt.

If this is the case, it has created quite the pickle for the Treasury. By issuing too much short-term debt, the Treasury is by default putting pressure on the Fed to not raise short-term interest rates. However, by issuing too much long-term debt, the Treasury is by default putting pressure on the Fed to maintain or even increase quantitative easing. To reiterate, this is why it is imperative the market believes inflation is transitory. The Treasury cannot stop issuing debt, which leaves the Fed unable to raise rates or taper QE without wreaking havoc in the bond market. Additionally, if the Fed has to fight inflation, then it’s not just the Treasury facing its Wiley Coyote moment, but the entire US economy.

Wrapping up

With the economy reopening, the Treasury deployed its cash balance at the most opportune time, unless of course inflation numbers continue to increase (which based on all the data, anecdotal evidence, and liquidity in the repo market seems like a strong possibility). Unfortunately for the Fed, the Treasury will have to begin re-issuing debt again. Will it lean towards short-term debt hoping the Fed keeps interest rates low, or long-term debt hoping the Fed will expand QE?

But Fed may be constrained either way because it has its own problem. Powell must be praying that inflation readings come in low AND job numbers disappoint. If both don’t occur, then tough questions will be asked to justify more stimulus. Yellen and Powell may be best buds, but simple coordination will not be enough. They will need magic and luck to keep the course steady heading into 2H 2021 and 2022.

If the Fed is lucky enough to get low inflation readings out of its rigged CPI, it may provide cover to begin tapering. Rising long-term rates won’t have the same compounding effect on inflation expectations in a “low” inflation environment. Unfortunately, long-term rates will not be tenable over the medium term as the government has to finance more and more debt. As the market this year has indicated, when issuance surpasses Fed buying, rates have gone up. So what happens to rates when the Fed leaves the market entirely? Presumably, they go up a lot. How high will the Fed let rates go before re-entering?

Just because something is inevitable (US Debt spiral) does not make it imminent; however, the next six months of data may shine a bright light on all the irresponsibility over the last 12 years if inflation proves not so transitory. Chances are, the only thing transitory will be “talking about talking about” tapering.

US Debt interactive charts and graphs can always be found on the Exploring Finance dashboard: https://exploringfinance.shinyapps.io/USDebt/

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